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Abstract 
 
Title:  Firm Level Factors affecting Liquidity-The Swedish Stock Market 
Authors: Jose Roberto Pagoada and Kim Jonsson 
Advisor: Birger Nilsson 
Keywords: Liquidity, Illiquidity, Amihud measure, Bid Ask Spread, Turnover, Liquidity 
Premium, LCAPM 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further look at which firm-adjustable factors affect the 
liquidity of a firm's stock in the Swedish stock market. We also want to determine which out of 
these suggested factors have a significant effect on liquidity across different proxies of liquidity. 
Finally we aim to determine whether our findings are consistent with previous research 
findings. 
Methodology: A quantitative approach with the interpretation of the results from panel data 
regressions. 
Theoretical framework: Liquidity Capital Asset Pricing Model (LCAPM) 
Empirical foundation: A sample of 433 firms during the time period 2000-2014 
Conclusions: We come to the conclusion that the firm’s assets liquidity and the ownership 
structure, more specifically the cash and cash equivalents and the free floating shares, have a 
positive relationship with liquidity for firms on the Swedish Stock market. These findings are 
consistent with other studies in other markets. Our data did however not provide significant 
results to establish a relationship between liquidity and capital structure or dividend payout 
policies.  
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I . Introduction 
 
 
 
Amihud and Mendelson first established a link between expected excess returns and liquidity 
in 1986. Their study arrived to the conclusion that investors require higher returns on less liquid 
stock. Studies such as Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan et al (1998) and, Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) have all validated the findings of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
indicating that the level of liquidity indeed has an effect on expected returns and as a result also 
on asset pricing. They distinguish between the level of liquidity and the liquidity risk where the 
former is the amount of liquidity measured for example by the bid-ask spread and the latter is 
the risk that the illiquidity level will deviate from its expected value.  
 
In a later paper Amihud & Mendelson (1991) describe their 1986 results as the liquidity effect. 
The liquidity effect is compared to the effect of risk on capital assets. Just like risk-averse 
investors require additional compensation for bearing higher risks, investors will require 
additional compensation for bearing additional illiquidity on its assets. The liquidity effect 
shows how the microstructure of security markets is relevant for firms as well as the value of 
financial policies targeting to increase the liquidity of individual securities and of the market as 
a whole. Private benefits can thus be created by increasing securities’ liquidity since issuers are 
able to sell more liquid stock at higher prices. Liquidity is therefore essential when developing 
a company’s financial policies regarding financial instruments. Similarly financial analysts 
must include liquidity in their stock valuations. Financial advisors also should aim to match the 
investors liquidity needs with the assets included in the portfolio.  
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This has inspired a vast number of studies to look at variables that affect liquidity and its 
associated costs. Additional implications have been explored given this liquidity effect 
including implications for corporate management, for capital structure (O’Connor, Lesmond & 
Senbet, 2008; Lipson & Mortal, 2009), for security design regarding the number of markets in 
which a stock is listed (Amihud, Lauterbach and Mendelson, 2003), for payout policies 
regarding dividends and buybacks (Banerjee, Gatchev, Spindt, 2007; Brockman, Howe and 
Mortal, 2008) as well as corporate investment decisions, corporate governance and managerial 
incentives (Amihud and Mendelson, 2012). Variables that affect liquidity can be separated into 
systematic factors (non-firm-adjustable) and firm-adjustable factors. Systematic factors 
concern such factors that cannot be affected by an individual firm which are due to 
macroeconomic factors. Firm-adjustable factors include factors that an individual firm can 
modify on their own. Extensive literature exists on individual factors in the form of suggestions 
of liquidity-enhancing policies since there is a connection between these factors, liquidity and 
returns separately. These include going public, increasing the small investor base, increasing 
the information disclosure, modifying the dividend payout policy, increasing the firm cash 
liquidity, avoiding fragmentation when issuing securities. Researchers still have the task to 
determine which of the policies have a higher impact in increasing the securities’ liquidity and 
to explore additional liquidity-enhancing policies. 
 
The purpose of this study is to further look at which firm-adjustable factors might affect the 
liquidity of a firm's stock in the Swedish stock market. We also want to determine which out of 
these suggested factors have a significant effect on liquidity across different proxies of liquidity. 
Finally we aim to determine whether our findings are consistent with previous research 
findings. This has a potential to help Swedish firms decide which action the most beneficial in 
terms of increasing liquidity and as result to their stock price. Our focus is on the Swedish stock 
market due to the previous lack of studies conducted in this setting. It is worth mentioning that 
the Swedish stock market differs from for example the US market in the sense that there are no 
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real market makers for the stocks given that trading is executed primarily electronically. For 
our study we therefore consider the electronic order book as the market maker.  
 
Our models will be estimated by running panel data regressions using a number of explanatory 
variables representing four firm-adjustable factors: a) the dividend policy measured by its 
dividend yield, b) the firm’s assets’ liquidity measured by  cash and cash equivalents and by 
the quick ratio, c) information disclosure and capital structure both proxied by a single variable 
debt level, and d) the firm’s ownership structure measured by its percentage of free floating 
shares and by its percentage of institutionally held shares. Three proxies are used for measuring 
liquidity: the bid-ask spread, the Amihud measure and the turnover.  
 
 It is important to have in mind that the costs associated with implementing the suggested 
financial policies are out of the scope of this study. There is as always a cost versus benefit 
analysis that needs to be performed by a company in order to determine if said policy effect on 
liquidity will outweigh the implementation costs. This is a topic that requires further research.  
 
As previous studies have shown, there is an economic and significant relation between the 
expected return and the liquidity of a firm's stock. This relationship affects the firm’s stock 
price, which then can be lower than what the fundamental value indicates. This result has 
implications for firms because if they decrease the costs that arise from liquidity they can 
improve their stock price, everything else being equal. Amihud and Mendelson (2000) showed 
that this increase in stock price could be achieved without changing other important corporate 
characteristics such as expected earnings, growth, assets etc. Furthermore, an increase in 
liquidity would not only benefit the individual company by an increased stock price but also 
the financial market as a whole. Improved liquidity will result in smaller spreads and a smaller 
price impact. In the end, this will bring the real market closer to the underlying principle of 
perfectly liquid markets made in asset pricing theory eliminating liquidity as a friction and 
resulting in more efficient capital allocation.  
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Our findings reveal certain similarities with previous studies with some of the firm-adjustable 
factors although for some firm-adjustable factors the data does not allow to make any significant 
conclusions. We show how the dividend policies have a significant relationship with liquidity 
but no conclusion can be determined regarding the sign (positive or negative) of this 
relationship.  The firm’s assets’ liquidity measured by the cash and cash equivalents has a 
positive relationship with liquidity and is consistent with previous studies (Gopalan, Kadan and 
Pevzner, 2012). However when the quick ratio measurement is used we observe a significant 
negative relationship. A possible explanation for this result could be the fact that this 
measurement captures a different aspect of the asset’s liquidity which causes the negative 
relationship. Finally, data showed that the ownership structure of a firm is significantly related 
to the liquidity of a firm. The number of free-floating shares is positively related to liquidity as 
other studies had found (Amihud et al. 1999). Based on these results firms in Sweden may align 
their financial policies to increase their firm’s assets’ liquidity and increase their free floating 
shares in order to improve their stock’s liquidity.  
On the other hand we obtained inconclusive results for two variables. Our results did not reveal 
any significant relationship between our variable (DEBT_LEV) measuring the debt level of a 
firm, representing both the capital structure and the information disclosure of the firm, and 
liquidity. Moreover the findings on the institutional shareholding were only significant for one 
of the proxies of liquidity (ILLIQ), thus not allowing us to make substantial conclusions 
regarding the relationship with liquidity. Further studies remain to be conducted to determine 
whether dividend payout policies are positively or negatively related to the liquidity of a stock 
as well the existence of a significant relationship between capital structure and information 
disclosure and liquidity in Sweden.  
 
 
The remaining four chapters of the thesis include in Chapter II a theoretical background, 
Chapter III a description of the methodology. Chapter IV presents the results of our study and 
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Chapter V has a summary of the study and concluding remarks. Chapter II’s theoretical 
background discusses the different literature on liquidity, the associated liquidity premium and 
a review of the literature that establishes a connection of the micro market structure and its 
implications on corporate finance. It concludes with a review of prior research conducted on 
the Swedish stock market. Chapter III details the data used and the sources where it was 
obtained. It follows with a description of the liquidity variables, the independent variables and 
the control variables. It ends with summary statistics of the variables, the description of the 
models for the regression and a discussion of validity and reliability of the data. Chapter IV 
presents the final results of the study as well as a discussion analyzing and interpreting these 
results. Lastly, Chapter V summarizes all the results and presents our conclusions from the 
study.  
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II . Theoretical Background 
 
 
A.  Liquidity 
 
The concept of liquidity is a well-researched topic, many scholars and researchers have 
investigated the costs that are associated with liquidity and the implications that these have for 
asset pricing and price efficiency. Costs that are associated with liquidity are primarily related 
to the notion of information and friction costs, which include adverse selection, opportunity, 
and direct costs such as commissions & fees. (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000; Agarwal, 2009). 
These costs will be covered in more detail later on in this chapter. 
There are two distinct types of liquidity, the first one called trading liquidity indicates how fast 
something can be transacted and to which roundtrip cost, and the other one called funding 
liquidity indicates the ease with which a firm can obtain funding (Hibbert et al, 2009; Amihud 
et al, 2005). The two concepts are somewhat interlinked, especially in times of economic crisis. 
We will however focus on trading liquidity in this paper, and the fact that an illiquid asset will 
take a longer time to transact than a liquid one, which in turn have implications for asset pricing 
(Amihud & Mendelson, 2000; Amihud et al, 2005). Much theory of asset pricing is built on 
some assumptions such as no arbitrage, equilibrium and utility maximization, together with the 
notion of perfect liquid markets without frictions. These assumptions mean that every asset can 
be traded at any time with no additional cost (Amihud et al, 2005; Pennacchi, 2008). Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) derive a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM) to capture 
the impact of liquidity risk and commonality on asset pricing. Unlike the traditional CAPM 
model, which assumes no additional costs when pricing the asset, Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
incorporates trading costs or frictions to the model:  
𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 ) = (𝑟𝑓) + 𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 ) + 𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 − 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 , 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑚 )
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑚 )
                                              [1] 
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where,  𝑡=𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑚 − 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓 ) is the risk premium 
 
In this version, the variables are conditional on the information available up to time t, where 
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖  is the expected return for the stock, 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑚  is the market return,  𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate and 
𝑐𝑡+1 
𝑖 is the liquidity level premium for the stock. The liquidity level premium represent 
transactions costs, such as fees and the bid-ask spread, and in a wider setting, they can also 
represent search and delay costs for the particular asset (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005). This 
model also captures the liquidity risk premium, represented by the second term in the equation; 
this captures the uncertainty in the liquidity cost itself. The relationship is that total liquidity 
premium consists of both liquidity level premium and liquidity risk premium as captured by the 
LCAPM.  This means that if illiquidity is zero (𝑐𝑡+1
𝑚 = 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑖 = 0), there will be no liquidity 
frictions and the equation above equals the traditional CAPM model. This makes the liquidity-
adjusted capital asset pricing model consistent with earlier research that have shown that an 
illiquid asset can trade below its fundamental value, which is the present value of its dividends, 
everything else being equal. This price difference is as discussed above called the liquidity 
premium (Lester et al. 2012).  
 
A.1. Associated Costs 
 
The total cost associated with the liquidity level premium can be divided into information costs 
and real friction costs. Information cost relates to the fact that investors hold different information, 
implying that there is a risk that you are dealing with an informed investor when executing a 
trade. These costs are often referred to as adverse selection costs (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000). 
The notion of real friction costs relates to costs associated with the actual trade, such as brokerage 
fees and search costs. These types of costs are often referred to as opportunity costs and direct 
costs. In this section we will cover these costs in more detail.  
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A.1.1 Adverse selection costs 
 
The notion of adverse selection costs can also be referred to as information costs and is an 
important component of total liquidity costs as captured by the bid-ask spread (Amihud & 
Mendelson, 2000; Agarwal, 2009). Since the bid-ask spread represent the highest and lowest 
price at which an investor can buy and sell an asset instantaneously it represent liquidity. The 
spread difference in itself, which is the actual difference between the bid and ask price in 
absolute numbers, also indicates the cost of liquidity for limited quantities. When selling a 
larger quantity the investor can actually move the sell price in a negative way, which in turn 
also might hurt the investor because he gets a lower price. This sort of transaction usually cause 
the stock price to decline, but part of the effect is just temporary and part of it is a lasting effect. 
When talking about market impact costs we talk about the temporary effect that a large 
transaction have on stock price (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000). These types of costs are called 
adverse selection costs since the information that make the transaction happen may not be 
included in the market price of the stock. 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brockman et al (2009) and Aslan et al. (2011) all look at 
these adverse selection cost by differencing between informed and uninformed investors. 
Informed investors are those who have superior information about a firm and its stock value, 
while uninformed investors are those who trade based on liquidity. Trading on liquidity means 
that they buy and sell stocks when they have a shortage or abundance of money. These two 
groups cannot easily be separated by the market maker and as a result the bid-ask spread will 
be larger when they think they are dealing with informed investors (Amihud & Mendelson, 
2005). Evidence shows that when the identity of a seller of a large quantity of stocks is unknown 
the market maker will assume that the seller is informed. This will then cause the spread to 
widen (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000). Other studies have validated this finding by looking at 
companies with a large number of shareholders and the effect that this have on the bid ask 
spread. Benston and Hagerman (1974) found a negative correlation between a stocks bid-ask 
spread and the number of shareholders. Brockman et al. (2009) also found a similar result when 
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looking at the effect of block ownership on the bid-ask spread. Brockman et al. (2009) define 
block holders as shareholders that hold more than 5% of a firms total shares, They found that 
block ownership tend to increase the spread and as a result decrease liquidity, and increase the 
adverse selection component.  
 
A.1.2 Opportunity costs 
 
Opportunity costs relate to the notion of friction costs and captures search frictions and execution 
delays. The buyer or a seller of a large quantity of stocks faces a choice between immediate 
transactions or searching for a buyer/seller that is willing to pay a better price. The immediate 
transaction includes turning to a market maker which buys the security at a discount, this 
transaction might also include the risk of market impact (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000; Amihud 
et al. 2005). When choosing to search for a better counterparty there is a delay/opportunity cost 
related to this action arising from the fact that the market might move, this cost is hard to 
measure but according to some studies, it can be substantial (Amihud & Mendelson 2000). 
 
A.1.3 Direct costs 
 
Direct costs relate to the notion of exogenous transaction costs, and include the cost that a buyer 
or seller faces every time a transaction is being carried out. This includes things such as broker 
fees, transaction fees, taxes etc. (Hibbert et al., 2009). When facing a transaction investors look 
at the total cost of buying or the net revenue from selling, so they include all types of cost in 
their assessments (Amihud & Mendelson 2000). Other studies by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) 
showed that there is a difference between block owners (owners of 5% of companies stocks) 
and individual investors, and their willingness to pay commission fees in return for less market 
impact of their trade. However, with the ease and help of the internet commission fees has 
declined sustainably during the past decade. 
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A.2 Liquidity Measurements 
 
A.2.1 Bid-Ask Spread 
 
As previously mentioned the bid-ask spread works as a proxy for liquidity because it represents 
the cost at which an asset can be either sold or bought instantaneously. This means that the 
spread itself gives an indicator of the liquidity; a wider spread indicates illiquidity. It is also 
possible to compute the difference between the ask price and the bid price to get an absolute 
number on liquidity cost for limited quantities (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986) (Amihud et al., 
2005). The relative quoted bid-ask spread(QSit) is measured as followed: 
 
QSit =  
[𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡−𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡]
(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡)/2
 ,                                                                                                             [2] 
where 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 , 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡 stands for the ask and bid price for company i, at time t. The spread also 
depends on adverse selection costs, which arises because the market makers cannot distinguish 
between informed and uninformed investors (Aslan et al., 2011; Brockman et al, 2009). 
Furthermore, the spread should also be wide enough to cover the inventory cost (the cost of 
holding on to the asset before they can sell them) for the market makers (Amihud et al., 2005). 
These attributes together with the accessibility of the actual spread quotes in the market make 
it a popular proxy for liquidity in earlier research.  
 
A.2.2 Amihud Measure 
 
The Amihud measure was proposed by Yakov Amihud in 2002 in order to examine the 
relationship of stock returns and liquidity over time. It is defined as the daily ratio of absolute 
stock return over its dollar volume averaged over some period of time. It is designed to capture 
the price impact of trading by measuring the daily price response related to a dollar of trading. 
Illiquidity (ILLIQit) is measured as follows: 
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ILLIQit =
|Rit∗100|
Vit
 ,                                                                                                                       [3] 
where Rit is the price return on asset i, at time t, and Vit is the volume of trading. 
This measure has been widely used among researchers given the wide availability and easiness 
to obtain the data to calculate the illiquidity of an asset. (De Jong and Driessen, 2012; Han and 
Zhou, 2007; Dick-Nielsen et al. 2012; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Goyenko, Holden and 
Trzcinka (2009) conducted a study to compare the different measures and determine to what 
extent they captured liquidity. They concluded that the Amihud measure is a good proxy for 
capturing price impact and they recommend this measure to be used if no high-frequency data 
are available. 
 
 
A.2.3 Turnover 
 
Another measurement that is used to represent liquidity is the turnover. Brooke et al. (2000) 
uses turnover together with the bid-ask spread to measure liquidity. The turnover is simply the 
total trading volume of an asset over a specified period divided by the number of outstanding 
assets during the same period.  Turnover (TURNit) is measured as follows:  
 
TURNit =   
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
.                                                                                  [4] 
This measurement gives an indication of how transacted a specific asset is and studies such as 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) found a negative relation between turnover and illiquidity costs. 
Indicating that a higher turnover is associated with higher liquidity, which is consistent with 
earlier findings regarding size determinants of the bid-ask spread. However, researchers such 
as Agarwal (2009) argue that the turnover measurement is a noisy measure for liquidity since 
it also captures other effects and as a result, it should be used as a complement.  
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B. Liquidity Premium 
 
Based on standard asset pricing theory, in a frictionless market, assets with the same cash flows 
will have the same price (Hibbert et. al., 2009). It has been shown however that market frictions 
such as transaction costs affect asset pricing. Another aspect of asset pricing has been the 
assumption that investors are risk averse, which has lead research to identify and measure the 
different risks associated with each asset (Bossaerts, Plott and Zame, 2000). Empirical research 
provides strong support to the theory that riskier assets require a higher rate of return from 
investors. In other words investors need compensation for bearing risks, which is known as 
equity risk premium. 
 
Liquidity as reviewed in the previous section is a very broad concept that has many aspects and 
applications in financial economics, asset pricing, and corporate finance. Many studies have 
researched the link that exists between liquidity and asset prices, hypothesizing and empirically 
proving that liquidity is also priced in financial assets. The existence of a liquidity premium has 
implications for asset pricing since it changes the underlying assumptions on which it rests 
(Amihud et al, 2005). The concept of liquidity premium has had a degree of complexity given 
that all assets have varying levels of illiquidity (Hibbert et. al., 2009). Nonetheless it has been 
defined as the difference in excess return, or the difference in stock price between an illiquid 
asset and its identical liquid asset counterpart. This has caused three main issues when 
determining the existence of a liquidity premium. First, researchers have had to identify and 
develop proxies to measure liquidity to allow for comparison. Second, different liquidity 
premiums exist for different asset classes (Amihud and Mendelson, 2012) such as corporate 
bonds (De Jong and Driessen, 2012; Han and Zhou, 2007), equity (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; 
Bekaert et al., 2007), government bonds (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Longstaff et al., 2005), 
covered bonds (Breger and Stovel, 2004). And lastly there have been many different methods 
to model and measure liquidity premium, which will be discussed next. 
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One of the first studies to look at the implications of liquidity on asset pricing was Amihud & 
Mendelson (1986), which looked at asset pricing in relation to the bid-ask spread. The reason 
for using the bid-ask spread is that it makes a simple proxy for illiquidity since the ask price 
includes a premium for immediate buy, and the bid price include a discount for immediate sale. 
In other words, a larger spread indicates a more illiquid stock and as a result, an investor should 
demand a higher expected return to compensate for this everything else being equal. Amihud 
& Mendelson (1986) found that asset returns are indeed an increasing function of the spread 
suggesting that liquidity affect the asset returns. Several other papers have then validated this 
relation. Brennan & Subrahmanyam (1996) looked at the relationship between monthly stock 
returns and measures of illiquidity. By performing a cross-sectional analysis of the stock returns 
as a function of the cost of liquidity, they found a significant positive relation between the two. 
Other studies by Brennan et al. (1998) looked at the relationship between return and liquidity, 
by modeling liquidity as stock trading volume; they found that higher stock trading volumes 
was correlated with lower expected stock returns. Datar et al. (1998) also took on a similar 
approach and modeled liquidity with stock turnover, they also found a similar result, and higher 
stock turnover meant lower returns. 
Studies that are more recent have also looked at the relationship between liquidity, liquidity risk 
and asset returns, Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) has all suggested 
that the level of liquidity and liquidity risk is a priced risk factor. Bradrania & Peat (2014) also 
look at this topic by using a two-factor asset-pricing framework, and found that liquidity has an 
impact on expected return and that it is a risk factor to include. 
 
This statistically significant relation between expected return and liquidity would then have an 
important effect for the value of a firm's stock. If there is a premium for liquid stocks this means 
that the stock price would be higher compared to an illiquid stock. From the reasoning above, 
this means that an investor would demand a higher return for an illiquid stock, which is achieved 
by a lower stock price, everything else being equal (Amihud & Mendelson, 2000). Therefore, 
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there seems to be incentives for firms to try to enhance the liquidity of their stock and as a result 
get a higher stock price. 
 
B.1 Estimation methods 
 
A vast literature examines the evidence of liquidity premium across different asset classes using 
different methods. An overview of the different methods is presented below structured by asset 
type based on Hibbert et al. (2009) classification. 
For corporate bonds there are four approaches used: the microstructure approach, the direct 
approach, the structural model approach and the regression based approach. The microstructure 
approach does not provide a model for empirical testing however emphasizes on a framework 
describing how trading costs and market costs explain the different expected returns and yields. 
The direct approach involves a more straightforward method wherein two assets or asset 
portfolios have the same characteristics but with varying levels of liquidity that allows 
calculating the difference in yields. Brooke et al. (2000) apply this method on the collateral 
repo rates resulting in an estimate of liquidity premium at 15 bp. The third approach consists 
on comparing an estimated fair credit spread to actual market spreads to derive the liquidity 
premium. This method is similar to the direct approach in the sense that it compares an illiquid 
asset to its liquid counterpart. Webber (2007) provides an example of this approach by 
proposing a model built on Leland and Toft’s (1996) method to derive default and demonstrates 
a rise in liquidity premium following a recent financial crisis. The regression analysis based 
approach has been widely used among researchers for two main purposes, one to identify the 
liquidity proxies that can be linked to higher yields, and second to attempt to quantify the 
liquidity premium by establishing the relationship between the liquidity proxy and the excess 
asset returns or yields. Han and Zhou (2007) and De Jong and Driessen (2012) conduct a 
regression analysis on corporate bonds. As an overview of the empirical evidence on liquidity 
premium of corporate bonds is that it is existent, substantial, varying over time. 
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For equity the main method used is regression analysis. Many studies advanced the literature 
on stock liquidity premium using a regression analysis after Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
The main difference consisted on the different liquidity measures used in their research. 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) used the daily intraday trade and quote data to estimate 
liquidity costs.  
Loderer and Roth (2005) used relative bid-ask spreads as liquidity measure instead. Brennan et 
al. (1998) and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) conducted their studies using stock trading volume 
as a measure of liquidity. On the other hand Datar et al. (1998) and Nguyen et al. (2007) use 
stock turnover as proxy for liquidity.  
Some studies focus not on proving the existence of a liquidity premium but instead aim to 
quantify it. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) develop a liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing 
model using Amihud (2002) measure for liquidity and estimate the return premium associated 
with liquidity at 3.5%. Bekaert et al. (2007) study the liquidity risk in emerging markets and 
estimated a local liquidity premium around 85 basis points per month. Lesmond (2005) studied 
the equity liquidity premium across 23 emerging markets and found differences in liquidity 
premium based on political and legal systems. Silva and Chávez (2008) analyses the liquidity 
premium in the Latin American equity markets. His findings showed an average of 8 % in 
liquidity premium across the four markets in the study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
C. Liquidity premium and the link to corporate finance 
 
Amihud and Mendelson hypothesize in their 1986 paper about a link between corporate finance 
policies and liquidity. They suggested, based on the evidence that more liquid stock required 
lower returns, that firms have an incentive to invest in liquidity-increasing financial policies in 
order to reduce the opportunity cost of capital thereby increasing the overall value of the firm. 
This implication on capital structure and firm value stems from the violation of one the 
assumptions in the Miller-Modigliani capital structure (Amihud and Mendelson, 2012). With 
the presence of high enough liquidity costs, like information and transaction costs, the firm’s 
equity cost of capital will be increased. Furthermore they have suggested (Amihud and 
Mendelson 1988, 1991) four main firm liquidity-enhancing strategies: 
 
(a) To increase the company’s investor base. Empirical evidence from a study of Japanese stock 
(Amihud et al. 1999) showed that improving the investor base resulted in increased stock 
liquidity and stock price. 
 
(b) To increase the information disclosure through direct and indirect dissemination. This strategy 
reduces the information asymmetries about firm value and thus increases stock price. 
 
(c) To avoid stock fragmentation. This strategy’s concept arises from the fact that having multiple 
stock types reduces the stock’s liquidity, therefore reducing individual stock price and overall 
firm value. Amihud et al. (2003) found that when two different set of assets from the same firm 
were merged, the stock became more liquid and rose in price. 
 
(d) To list on liquid exchange markets. Total liquidity contributes to the liquidity of the individual 
stock.  
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Further literature exists on other implications of liquidity on corporate finance. Bharath, 
Pasquariello and Wu (2009) explore the relationship between capital structure and stock 
liquidity. Their paper demonstrates that firms that have a higher debt level will have assets with 
lower liquidity. This illiquidity is explained by the exogenous information asymmetries that 
arise between the creditors who have more access to inside information and the shareholders. 
Furthermore they propose an incremental effect between information asymmetries and 
leverage. The higher the information asymmetries then the higher the likelihood to raise funds 
through debt, which will in turn cause higher information asymmetries. Additional literature by 
O’Connor, Lesmond and Senbet (2008) also reinforces and demonstrates that the liquidity of a 
firm’s stock will decrease as the level of debt increases. Their study consists on analyzing firms 
that had capital structure changes in their sample period in order to examine the impact that it 
has on stock liquidity measured by the bid ask spread and a model to measure the price impact 
of liquidity. Lipson and Mortal (2009) also provide evidence and conclude that liquidity has a 
significant impact on capital structure decisions. Eckbo and Norli (2000) find that in the years 
subsequent to the IPO, IPO stocks have significantly lower leverage ratios and higher liquidity 
(turnover) than control firms matched on size. In overall, studies (e.g. O’Connor, Lesmond and 
Senbet, 2008; Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu, 2009) indicate that firms should take liquidity into 
account when managing the target level of debt of a firm. There is a tradeoff between the 
benefits of debt financing such as tax savings and the costs it causes from illiquidity. This effect 
can be further extended to the increase in the equity cost of capital.  
 
Another study by Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) explores the liquidity hypothesis of 
dividends. The hypothesis of dividends states that in a market with trading frictions, other things 
equal, firms with less liquid stock are more likely to pay out dividends. They do indeed find 
proof backing up their hypothesis. Brockman, Howe and Mortal (2008) conducted similar 
research on liquidity and dividend policy. However in their study they set out to prove the 
liquidity hypothesis of repurchases which claims that stock liquidity influences the decisions 
on corporate payout policy primarily through repurchases instead of dividends. The results 
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showed that firms who initiated repurchases are generally more liquid than firms who did not, 
comparably firms who initiated dividend payouts were less liquid than those who did not. Their 
study therefore reinforces the idea that dividend payouts are a form of compensation for less 
liquid stock. Griffin (2010) adds to the literature on dividend policy and stock liquidity. Their 
study supports the relationship previously found by Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007). 
Moreover, Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (1999) show that liquidity decreases as the level of inside 
ownership increases. They empirically prove as well that the stock liquidity is inversely related 
to institutional ownership. This entails that firms have the ability to improve their stock liquidity 
by targeting an appropriate level of inside ownership and institutional ownership. Note that 
firms may only aim for this appropriate level of inside ownership and/or institutional ownership 
since they cannot directly control whether institutions purchase their shares or not.  As 
explanation for this inverse relationship they suggest that the information asymmetries are an 
increasing function of insider holdings. In contrast to their study, a study by Glosten and Harris 
(1988) found an inconclusive and insignificant relation between stock liquidity and insider 
holdings using a sample of NYSE stocks from 1981 to 1983. Researchers have opposing results 
in regards to the relationship between stock liquidity and the percentage of insider holding. 
More recently Agarwal (2009) explores the relationship between liquidity and institutional 
ownership. He finds that an increase in institutional ownership may result in opposing effects 
on liquidity. On one hand it may decrease liquidity by increasing information asymmetry which 
he describes as an adverse selection effect. And on the other hand it may increase liquidity by 
increasing price discovery due to competition among institutions’ information efficiency effect. 
The relationship is described as non-monotonic (increasing liquidity at first until reaching 
optimality and then decreasing as institutional ownership increases).  
 
The liquidity of the stock also affects certain aspects related to corporate governance. Maug 
(1998) shows how liquid stock markets allow large investors to benefit from monitoring and it 
also helps to reduce the free-rider problem, thus improving corporate governance. Bolton and 
Von Thadden (1998) explore the costs and benefits of liquidity reflected by the firm’s 
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ownership structure. They compare the benefits of liquidity obtained from a dispersed 
ownership to the benefits of efficient management stemmed from a degree of ownership 
concentration, thus lower liquidity.  
 
D. Firm Liquidity 
 
After exploring the literature of liquidity in general first, followed by liquidity in asset pricing 
and its link to corporate financial policies, we proceed with another aspect of liquidity in order 
to get the broad picture of all the different liquidity terms that will be dealt with throughout this 
thesis. Firm liquidity can be defined as the availability of internal funds (Hoshi, Kashyap, 
Scharfstein, 1991). In other words it can be described as the firm’s ability to convert assets into 
cash in order to meet its financial obligations. The most liquid form of an asset is namely cash. 
Emery and Cogger (1982) state that firms maintain liquidity in order to meet near short term 
and long term expected and unexpected outflows. Among the widely used spread measures of 
firm liquidity are the current ratio which is current assets over current liabilities, the quick ratio 
which is the cash and cash equivalents over current liabilities, and net working capital which is 
current assets minus current liabilities (Bierman, 1960). Certain financial policies affect directly 
or indirectly the firm’s liquidity. Increasing the dividend payout for example will decrease the 
firm’s cash holdings thus the firm liquidity. Similarly, the corporate decision of setting a low 
cash holding target will have an impact of the firm’s liquidity. Gopalan, Kadan and Pevzner 
(2012) found a positive relationship between stock liquidity and the liquidity of the assets of a 
company (what we described as firm liquidity). Their study showed how asset liquidity 
improved stock liquidity more for firms which are less likely to reinvest their liquid assets. 
Their findings also revealed that an increase in corporate cash holdings has higher benefits for 
firms with more illiquid stock.  
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E. Earlier research in Sweden 
 
The relationship between stock returns and liquidity is not a well-researched topic when it 
comes to the Swedish stock market. There have just been a few previous studies investigating 
the concept of liquidity and the existence of a liquidity premium in Sweden. The findings of 
these studies are somewhat ambiguous in the support of the existence of a liquidity premium. 
Both Pavlica and Persson (2012), Svartholm and Uhrberg (2012), and Gerwin (2005) tried to 
validate the findings of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) by looking at the relationship between 
stock return and liquidity on the Swedish stock market. All of the studies took on a similar 
approach to try to investigate the relationship; they did portfolio analysis and cross-sectional 
regressions based on time series data. The data consisted of time series data of a variety of 
companies together with other variables such as the bid-ask spread as a proxy for measuring 
liquidity. Gerwin found only weak evidence regarding the relationship between liquidity and 
stock returns. Pavlica and Persson (2012) also did not find clear evidence for the existence of a 
liquidity premium. However, the studies argues that their sample periods can help to explain 
the ambiguous results they got with the later having a time period that is very volatile. Other 
studies such as Personne (2013) also investigates the same relationship to see if liquidity is a 
factor influencing returns on the Swedish stock market for the period 2001-2010. The author 
fits a Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model with an illiquidity factor to series of excess return. He finds 
that illiquidity has an impact on returns. 
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III . Methodology 
 
 
A. Sample and Data 
 
Our data sample consist of Swedish companies listed on both OMX and Aktietorget, we first 
collected the available data for all Swedish companies from Reuters DataStream. This gave us 
a sample size of approximately 900 companies. For each of these companies our desired 
explanatory variables where retrieved on a monthly basis for the time period 2000-01-01 to 
2014-12-31. The data needed to calculate our liquidity proxies where retrieved on a daily basis 
for the same time period to then calculate monthly averages to make the data consistent. The 
time period were selected based on two main reasons, first one being that we wanted as long of 
a period as possible to even out the volatility associated with the financial crisis of 2008. Second 
reason for not having a longer period of time is that there were limited data available before 
2000-01-01. We then started to reduce companies in a systematic way based on our liquidity 
variables. Our criterion was that companies that had no available information on our selected 
independent variables were to be deleted. This left us with a sample size of 433 companies, 
with 180 monthly observations each giving us a total of 77,940 observations. The data was 
structured as panel data, with companies as the cross sectional dimension. 
Several limitations were faced when conducting this research study. One limitation was the fact 
that the data was unbalanced. On a multivariate regression Eviews removes every period point 
that does not have a value for all the variables, thus reducing furthermore the sample size. In our 
sample we had a large number of observations as previously mentioned, nevertheless when 
running the regressions the sample size is reduced to approximately 27,000. Furthermore 
Eviews has certain limited functions regarding panel data validity tests, driving us to conduct 
manual tests to control for aspects such as heterogeneity for example. 
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B. Liquidity Variables 
 
We will use the aforementioned measurements: Bid-ask spread, Amihud-measure and the 
Turnover to proxy liquidity. The reason for using three measurements is to investigate if our 
firm level variables are significant across the suggested liquidity measurements. We have 
described the main logic behind these proxies and their formulas in the previous chapter. In this 
section, we will go further into why the particular measurements have been chosen and how we 
will calculate them based on our data sample. In order to see how the liquidity variables have 
evolved through our sampled time period we graphed the yearly average of ten randomly 
selected companies for each measurement as can be seen in Appendix A. 
 
The Bid-ask spread (BA_S) is used because of its characteristics but also because it is easily 
accessible in Thomson Reuter’s DataStream. Furthermore, we use the bid-ask spread because 
of previous studies showing that it is a valid proxy for liquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud and Mendelson (2005) and Dimson and Henke 
(2002) all use the bid-ask spread in their studies to model liquidity. We will use the quoted bid 
and ask prices of the companies in our data sample on a daily basis. In DataStream these daily 
quotes is defined as the latest bid and ask price. The spread itself is then calculated as the Ask 
price minus the Bid price divided by its midpoint, we will then take the average of these daily 
bid-ask spreads to obtain it on a monthly basis. In the graph depicting the evolution of the bid-
ask spread in Appendix A we observe two spikes in the spread indicating a decrease in liquidity. 
These events correspond to the internet bubble in early 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008.  
 
The Amihud-measure is as previously mentioned another popular proxy for liquidity because it 
captures the illiquidity of an asset. This measurement has also been used by a variety of previous 
studies such as Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Dick-
Nielsen et al (2012) to proxy liquidity. The Amihud-measure is also popular because of the 
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accessibility of the data on which it is calculated. We will use the quoted daily stock prices to 
calculate the daily stock returns on the companies in our data sample. To get the Amihud-
measure on a daily basis we will then divide the daily stock returns by the daily SEK volume 
traded. We will then take the average on these daily Amihud-measures to get a monthly Amihud 
measurement: ILLIQ. The graph of the Amihud measure evolution over our sample period 
(Appendix A) shows two main decreases in liquidity (increases in the Amihud measure) 
corresponding to 2008 and 2013. These observations may be the result of the 2008 financial 
crisis as well as the euro crisis of 2013. This measurement does not seem to capture any effect 
from the internet bubble in 2000 as does the bid-ask spread.  
 
Finally, we use the Turnover as our third proxy for liquidity. A number of studies has suggested 
that the turnover can be used to proxy liquidity sense it indicates how transacted a specific asset 
is. The turnover (TURN_VAL) is defined as the total trading volume of an asset over the 
number of outstanding assets. This measurement has also been used in previous studies such as 
Brooke et al. (2000) to model liquidity. We have obtained the turnover for the companies in our 
data sample from Thomson Reuter’s DataStream on a daily basis; this is defined as the number 
of shares traded on a particular day. To get the turnover ratio we will divide this number by the 
number of outstanding shares. We will then use the average of these to get it on a monthly basis. 
In appendix A the time trend of turnover is also graphed. We observe two increases in liquidity 
in the years 2001 and 2007. These years correspond to periods under stress nevertheless there 
seems to be an increase in liquidity based on this measurement. The reason for this could be 
due to the noisiness included in the measurement, turnover basically captures different aspects 
of trading and not just liquidity.  
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C. Explanatory Variables and Control Variables 
 
The aim of our study is to identify financial policies, which have a significant relation with the 
firm’s stock liquidity given the positive relation between stock liquidity and firm value. Based 
on previous literature discussed in chapter II we have selected a set of firm adjustable factors, 
(referred to as explanatory variables) as well as several control variables (which will be denoted 
as non-firm adjustable) to run a regression analysis. By firm adjustable factors we imply a set 
of internal factors that a firm is able to actively modify through different financial policies. On 
the other hand, the non-firm adjustable ones are external factors which, even though they are 
individually related to the firm, are difficult to change by management. Each factor will be 
measured using one or more variables. The intuition and measures used will be detailed next.  
 
C.1 Explanatory Variables 
 
Dividend Policy: 
 
The dividend policy has been shown to affect the liquidity of the stock (Banerjee, Gatchev and 
Spindt, 2007; and Griffin, 2010). Additionally firms are able to actively increment, maintain, 
lower or even cancel the dividend payouts in a firm. For the purpose of this study the fact that 
managers are normally reluctant to cut down dividends or initiate a dividend payment is 
ignored. This normally occurs since this cutting down dividends may suggest to investors that 
they feel the company’s prospects are not good enough to support a dividend payment any 
longer (Black, 1976). Similarly, initiating a dividend payment will require them to maintain it 
for a period of time. The variable used to measure dividend policy is the firm’s dividend yield 
(DIV_Y) calculated as the dividend per share as a percentage of the share price per month. 
Firm Liquidity: 
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Based on the study by Gopalan, Kadan and Pevzner (2012) in which they find a positive relation 
between firm assets’ liquidity and stock liquidity, a variable representing the firm’s cash 
holdings is included in the study. Two variables are used to measure this factor: Cash and cash 
equivalents, and Quick Ratio. Two measures are used because they capture different aspects of 
the firm liquidity. This can be observed by the fact that the correlation between them is low as 
seen in table 4. Cash and cash equivalents gives us an insight of the total liquid assets of the 
firm whereas quick ratio measures the ability of a firm to repay its liabilities. The variables are 
calculated as follows: 
CASH_EQ = (Cash & Equivalents / Total Current Assets)*100                                             [5] 
QUICK_R = ((Cash & Equivalents + Net receivables) / Total Current Liabilities)               [6] 
 
Information Disclosure and Capital Structure: 
 
One of the main difficulties that researchers have faced is selecting a right proxy for information 
disclosure. Chen et al. (2007) have used for example the Transparency and Disclosure rankings 
provided by S&P when exploring the relationship between corporate governance and equity 
liquidity. However, the rankings data for the Swedish companies selected in our sample and for 
our time span is unavailable. Our approach follows Agarwal’s (2009) model to proxy 
information disclosure as debt level of a firm. The capital structure of a firm can affect 
information disclosure as suggested in security design literature. In other words higher leverage 
is related to a lower level of public information disclosure since the debtholders become the 
firm’s main source of finance.  Moreover, information disclosure literature has shown that an 
increase in disclosure causes a reduction in information asymmetry, which results in an increase 
in liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). The bid-ask spread increases with higher 
information asymmetry reducing the liquidity of the stock. Therefore, a financial policy 
targeting the reduction of information asymmetries has a probable effect on increasing the 
liquidity of the stock. (Amihud and Mendelson, 1988). Based on this logic, our study uses 
DEBT_LEV as proxy for information disclosure which is: 
 26 
 
DEBT_LEV = (Long T. Debt +Short T. Debt & Current Long T. debt)/Total capital + Short 
T. Debt & Current Long T. Debt) *100                                                 [7] 
 
This variable has a double function that will shed light indirectly on the information disclosure 
and directly about the capital structure effect on liquidity.  
 
Stock ownership structure: 
 
The stock ownership structure of a firm has been linked to liquidity in previous studies 
(Agarwal, 2009; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Sarin, Shastri and Shastri, 1999). Additionally firms 
potentially have the ability to influence their stock ownership which is the reason why this 
factor is included as an explanatory factor. There are two variables used to capture and describe 
the ownership structure: Number of free-floating shares (F_FLOAT) and Number of Shares 
held by institutions (INST_SHARES). These variables will capture the number of shares 
available to the public and the number of shares held by institutional investors. They will be 
calculated monthly as a percentage of total shares outstanding to allow for comparison.  
 
C.2 Control Variables 
 
As control variables, we have selected variables that also have an effect on liquidity but are 
not directly firm adjustable. These are: profitability measured by Return on Equity (ROE) and 
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), Firm Size measured by the log of the Market Cap 
(M_CAP) these are calculated as followed:  
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ROIC = (Net Income – Bottom Line + ((Interest Expense on Debt - Interest Capitalized) * (1-
Tax Rate))) / Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s (Total Capital + Short Term Debt & 
Current Portion of Long Term Debt) * 100                                                                     [8] 
ROE = (Net Income – Bottom Line - Preferred Dividend Requirement / Average of Last Year's 
and Current Years Common Equity * 100                                           [9] 
M_CAP = LOG (Market Price-Year End * Common Shares Outstanding)                             [10] 
 
Besides these measurements we will add a dummy variable for those firms who pay or do not 
pay dividends (DIV_DUMMY), finally we will include monthly stock return volatility 
(R_VOL) 
 
D. Summary Statistics  
 
Table 1 present the summary statics for our chosen liquidity measures over the sample period. 
These liquidity measures are consistent with the once used in earlier studies such as Agarwal 
(2009), Amihud and Mendelson (1988). The number of observations available for each of these 
variables is approximately around the range of 50.000 – 53.000. 
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TABLE 1 Liquidity variables: Summary Statistics  
 
 
 
 BA_S ILLIQ TURN_VAL 
 Mean  4.664902  12.72853  86.29900 
 Median  1.732731  0.140701  3.000335 
 Maximum  143.9488  23493.07  516182.0 
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  8.965367  242.9950  3572.977 
 Skewness  5.060912  51.15808  105.9208 
 Kurtosis  39.61693  3388.278  12712.95 
    
 Jarque-Bera  3064022.  2.52E+10  3.55E+11 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
    
 Sum  237686.1  672130.0  4543988. 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  4095330.  3.12E+09  6.72E+11 
    
 Observations  50952  52805  52654 
 
Table 1.This table present summary statics for liquidity variables pooled over the entire sample period 2000-2014. BA_S is the 
Bid-Ask Spread, ILLIQ is the Amihud measure and TURN_VAL is the turnover, these measurements are calculated using monthly 
averages of daily data for the entire sample period. 
 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our chosen variables, including both our independent 
variables and the control variables for our pooled sample data. All of which have been included 
in previous studies that investigates what effects liquidity. Most of our variables have 
approximately 53.000 -55.000 observations. However shares available to the public, 
F_FLOAT, and institutional held shares, INST_SHARES, have 41.000 available observations. 
All the variables have been normalized or expressed in percentage to be comparable as stated 
in the previous section.  
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TABLE 2 Independent and control variables: Summary Statistics  
 
 CASH_EQ DEBT_LEV DIV_Y F_FLOAT INST_SHARES M_CAP QUICK_R R_VOL ROE ROIC DIVDUMMY 
 Mean  32.78847  27.03451  2.107913  68.85491  8.275860  13.60439  2.589197  35.65150 -10.55388 -5.813408  0.494870 
 Median  23.78000  21.02000  0.000000  71.00000  0.000000  13.33092  1.080000  32.77000  8.250000  5.960000  0.000000 
 Maximum  99.74000  544.3400  450.0000  100.0000  100.0000  20.56094  1135.810  87.62000  1959.060  340.1300  1.000000 
 Minimum  0.010000 -277.5100  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  6.514713  0.020000  10.09000 -4385.560 -1712.850  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  27.52337  29.01300  7.306290  25.29324  14.09409  2.571297  19.29881  13.02448  115.4093  59.17737  0.499978 
 Skewness  0.892972  1.954233  30.34503 -0.491400  2.720399  0.269705  48.44369  0.738823 -15.17976 -11.66229  0.020523 
 Kurtosis  2.674082  32.62814  1226.399  2.381350  12.60477  2.429369  2744.211  2.895525  541.4456  264.1026  1.000421 
            
 Jarque-Bera  7279.085  2187023.  3.44E+09  2305.587  208365.0  1398.255  1.65E+10  3777.944  6.66E+08  1.57E+08  9177.167 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
            
 Sum  1737985.  1588845.  116068.0  2825117.  339633.0  740432.5  136067.5  1473120. -580157.4 -318975.9  27249.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  40153183  49469908  2939312.  26248219  8151926.  359834.6  19572302  7009237.  7.32E+08  1.92E+08  13764.30 
            
 Observations  53006  58771  55063  41030  41039  54426  52552  41320  54971  54869  55063 
 
 
 
Table 2.This table present summary statics for liquidity variables pooled over the entire sample period 2000-2014. CASH_EQ is the cash & equivalents as a percentage 
out of total current assets, DEBT_LEV is the Total debt as a percentage of total capital.  DIV_Y is dividend yield calculated as the dividend per share as a percentage 
of the share price per month. F_FLOAT is the free-floating stocks available to the public calculated as percentage of total shares outstanding, INST_SHARES are 
institutional held shares calculated as percentage of total shares outstanding. M_CAP is market cap calculated as the log of the share market price at year end times 
number of common outstanding shares, QUICK_R is the quick ratio calculated as Cash & Equivalents + Net receivables over total current asset, R_VOL is the return 
volatility, ROE is the return on equity, ROIC is the return on invested capital, and DIVDUMMY is a dummy variable capturing if a company pays dividends or not, 
all of these measurements are calculated using monthly data. 
 30 
E. Regression 
 We want to see if our independent variables and control variables are related to liquidity in a 
consistent matter across our three proxies for liquidity. This will be done by running multivariate 
regressions using our liquidity proxies as the dependent variable. However to check that our 
results are robust we will run several regressions by adding the control variables one by one.  
Model 1:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐸𝑄𝑡+𝛽2DEBT_LEV𝑡 + 𝛽3DIV_Y𝑡+𝛽4F_FLOAT𝑡+𝛽5INST_SHARES𝑡+𝛽6QUICK_R𝑡       [11] 
 
This model was run without the control variables for all three liquidity proxies, meaning that we 
change Y to stand for bid-ask spread(BA_S), Amihud measure (ILLIQ), and turnover 
(TURN_VAL). This will be done for all the following regressions as well.  
Model 2:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐸𝑄𝑡+𝛽2DEBT_LEV𝑡 + 𝛽3DIV_Y𝑡+𝛽4F_FLOAT𝑡+𝛽5INST_SHARES𝑡+𝛽6QUICK_R𝑡+ 
𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡+𝜀𝑡  [12] 
 
Model 3:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐸𝑄𝑡+𝛽2DEBT_LEV𝑡 + 𝛽3DIV_Y𝑡+𝛽4F_FLOAT𝑡+𝛽5INST_SHARES𝑡+𝛽6QUICK_R𝑡+ 
𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡+𝛽8𝑀_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡+𝜀𝑡  [13] 
 
Model 4:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐸𝑄𝑡+𝛽2DEBT_LEV𝑡 + 𝛽3DIV_Y𝑡+𝛽4F_FLOAT𝑡+𝛽5INST_SHARES𝑡+𝛽6QUICK_R𝑡+ 
𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡+𝛽8𝑀_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡 +𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡  +𝜀𝑡  [14] 
 
Model 5:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐸𝑄𝑡+𝛽2DEBT_LEV𝑡 + 𝛽3DIV_Y𝑡+𝛽4F_FLOAT𝑡+𝛽5INST_SHARES𝑡+𝛽6QUICK_R𝑡+ 
𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡+𝛽8𝑀_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡+𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡  +𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 𝑡 +𝜀𝑡  [15] 
 
Model 6 is the final model including all the control variables: 
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Model 6: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻_𝐸𝑄𝑡+𝛽2DEBT_LEV𝑡 + 𝛽3DIV_Y𝑡+𝛽4F_FLOAT𝑡+𝛽5INST_SHARES𝑡+𝛽6QUICK_R𝑡+ 
𝛽7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑡+𝛽8𝑀_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡 +𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡  +𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 𝑡+𝛽11𝑅_𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡+𝜀𝑡  [16] 
 
F. Reliability and validity 
The concept of reliability and validity is of importance when doing studies such as this one. As 
previously mentioned all of our data has been collected using DataStream and therefore should 
be considered reliable. Furthermore we have included variables that previous studies on the 
subject of liquidity have found significant and as a result we feel comfortable using these in our 
study as well.  
 
When conducting regressions using OLS it is important to check that the data is robust and we 
will conduct several tests on our data to verify that it meets the requirements for performing OLS 
regressions (Brooks, 2008).  
 
F.1 Data testing  
 
Heteroscedasticity: 
 
One assumption being used in OLS estimations is that the residuals have constant variance. If 
there is any kind of correlation between its residuals this assumption is violated and 
heteroscedasticity occurs. Since Eviews do not offer built in options for testing panel data for 
heteroscedasticity we perform a manual Breusch-Pagan test for the explanatory variables 
(Brooks, 2008).  The test is done by estimating the regression of model 6 and to save the squared 
residuals from this. We then use the squared residuals as the dependent variable and run the test 
again with our explanatory variables. Looking at the p-value associated with the F-test (0.000) 
tells us that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected indicating that we have a 
problem with heteroscedasticity in our data. This was the case across all of our liquidity 
 32 
measures (See Appendix B). To account for this we will run our regressions using White´s 
robust standard errors.  
 
Heterogeneity: 
 
Using a standard pooled regression assumes that there is no heterogeneity, meaning that there is 
no dependence between observations on a variable within different cross sectional units, and no 
time specificity. In other words it assumes that there is no correlation between the residuals within 
a cross sectional unit or in the time period dimension. This could be a problem when dealing with 
a large panel data set (Brooks, 2008).  
 
A simple way to deal with this problem is to use either fixed effects in either the time dimension 
or the cross sectional dimension, or both. Using fixed effects allows the intercept to differ across 
cross section and time. An alternative to fixed effects is the random effects which assume that the 
intercept for each cross sectional unit arises from a common intercept, and a random term which 
varies cross sectionally but is constant over time (Brooks, 2008). 
 
To test for the poolability of the data we ran a redundant fixed effects test in both cross section 
and period fixed effects for each of our liquidity variables. The associated p-values of the F-
statistics were 0 to four decimal figures, indicating that a pooled regression was not suitable for 
the data (See Appendix C) .We then proceeded to test whether random effects should be used by 
conducting a Hausmann test, which p-value was zero for the bid-ask spread and the Amihud 
measure indicating that fixed effects should be used. However the p-value for turnover was 
insignificant (>5%) suggesting that the random effects model is more suitable for the data. For 
comparison we included the tables in the Appendix C showing the regression coefficients for all 
three models. As a general observation the coefficients are consistent throughout the different 
models for each of our liquidity variables, with minor deviations.  
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Multicollinearity:  
 
According to Brooks (2008) multicollinearity arises when the independent variables in a multiple 
regression are correlated. Correlation between independent variables will exist however it 
becomes a statistical issue when this correlation becomes very high.  
In order to detect for issues of multicollinearity we looked at the Table 4 of correlations of the 
independent variables and the control variables. According to Gujarati (2002) correlation 
coefficients higher than 0.8 or lower than -0.8 indicates a problem of multicollinearity. The 
correlation coefficients range from -0.5390 to 0.3507 therefore not exceeding the lower or upper 
limits. There is thus no problem of multicollinearity in our data.  
 
Normality: 
 
Normality refers to the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed. Non-normality 
is caused by extreme values referred to as outliers (Brooks, 2008). To test for non-normality we 
conducted the Jarque-Bera tests. Results are shown in Appendix D for all the three final models. 
The results show very high values for Jarque-Bera for all three liquidity variables rejecting the 
null hypothesis of normality. For a large sample size however, Brooks (2008) states that a 
violation of normality has no significant effects on the validity of the model.  
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IV . Results and Analysis  
 
 
In this section we will present the correlations between our liquidity proxies as well as for our 
independent and control variables. Furthermore, we will present our results from our 
regressions and analyze them accordingly.  
 
A. Correlations  
 
Table 3 present the correlation between our liquidity variables. The correlations coefficient 
ranges from -0,006 to 0,086 between our variables. However the signs of the correlations is 
more interesting since it indicates what sort of relationship that exist between our proxies for 
liquidity. Our liquidity measures were chosen to capture different aspects of liquidity. As 
previously mentioned a wider bid ask spread (BA_S) indicates a more illiquid stock, while a 
higher Amihud measure (ILLIQ) also indicates illiquidity. This means that there should be a 
positive relationship between the two, which our data suggest that there is, however the 
relationship is weaker than expected. Our third proxy for liquidity is the turnover measure 
(TURN_VAL), which measures how transacted a specific asset is, a higher turnover should 
relate to a smaller bid ask spread and a lower Amihud measure. This means that there should 
be a negative relation between turnover, bid ask spread and Amihud measure, according to our 
data this is the case even if the relationship is rather weak.  
 
TABLE 3.Correlation liquidity variables 
 BA_S ILLIQ TURN_VAL 
BA_S 1.000000   
ILLIQ 0.085775 1.000000  
TURN_VAL -0.005765 -0.001157 1.000000 
Table 3.This table presents the Pearson correlations for our liquidity variables over the pooled sample period 2000-2014 
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Table 4 present the correlation between our independent variables and our control variables. As 
we can see by the Pearson correlation matrix there are some significant relationships between 
our independent variables. However these are according to theory for instance we can see a 
negative correlation (-0,41) between CASH_EQ and DEBT_LEV. This is consistent with 
theory since when cash and cash equivalents increase this increase total capital which decreases 
the debt level percentage. Another negative correlation (-0,38) can be found between F_FLOT 
and INST_SHARES, which also is consistent with theory since the more intuitional held shares 
the less publicly available once. There is also a positive correlation (0.35) between F_FLOAT 
and R_VOL.  
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TABLE 4.Correlation independent and control variables  
 
 CASH_EQ DEBT_LEV DIV_Y F_FLOAT INST_SHARES M_CAP QUICK_R R_VOL ROE ROIC 
CASH_EQ  1.000000          
DEBT_LEV -0.411799  1.000000         
DIV_Y -0.110921  0.042017  1.000000        
F_FLOAT  0.151275 -0.051865 -0.116010  1.000000       
INST_SHARES -0.100003  0.067423  0.122398 -0.387490  1.000000      
M_CAP -0.191421  0.194579  0.145951 -0.244325  0.266299  1.000000     
QUICK_R  0.158932 -0.076342 -0.022381  0.008541 -0.018678 -0.033481  1.000000    
R_VOL  0.322768 -0.186434 -0.268750  0.350746 -0.204414 -0.539022  0.047162  1.000000   
ROE -0.034846 -0.140137  0.081901 -0.074909  0.059126  0.187444  0.010378 -0.212585  1.000000  
ROIC -0.159174  0.002247  0.133280 -0.157506  0.097170  0.294525  0.017814 -0.372667  0.479069  1.000000 
Table 4.This table presents the Pearson correlations for our independent variables and our control variables over the pooled sample period 2000-2014
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B. Regression Results and Analysis  
Bid-Ask Spread: 
 
Table 5 presents our results for the final regression with the bid-ask spread as the dependent 
variable.  As previously mentioned, this regression is conducted by using fixed effects as our 
earlier redundant fixed effect test suggested. We used Eviews to run these regressions and as can 
be seen the number of observation used in the regression (27.886) was almost a quarter of our 
total observations. The reason for this is that Eviews only use the observations that have available 
data points for all cross-sectional units. Turning to our results, we find some interesting 
discoveries regarding the relationship between our independent variables and our first measure 
for liquidity (bid-ask spread).  Starting with the insignificant variables, we have some results that 
was in contrast to what we first anticipated.  Both the number of shares available for trade by the 
public, measured by free-floating shares (F_FLOAT), and the number of shares held by 
institutional investors (INST_SHARES) showed not to be significant for the bid-ask spread. This 
was not what we expected since earlier studies such as Amihud and Mendelson (2000) suggested 
that increasing the free-floating stock would decrease the bid-ask spread, however we cannot find 
such a relationship in our data.  Gopalan, Kadan and Pevzner (2012) found a positive 
relationship between a firm’s assets liquidity and its stock liquidity, and to capture this we 
included two measurements, cash and cash equivalents (CASH_EQ) and quick ratio 
(QUICK_R). As can be seen in the results we find that cash and cash equivalents are strongly 
insignificant for the bid-ask spread but the quick ratio where just barely insignificant on a 5% 
significant level. 
 
Turning to the variables that showed to be significant we find results that are in alignment with 
earlier studies, for instance we use market cap (M_CAP) as a measurement of size, and return 
on invested capital (ROIC) as a profitability measurement. Both of these variables where 
significant on a 0,1% significance level, and showed a negative relationship with the bid-ask 
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spread suggesting liquidity increase with size and profitability. This result is consistent with 
studies such as Amihud (2002) that shows that company size is positively correlated with 
liquidity. Turning to the capital structure, Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) showed that 
firms that have a higher debt level would have assets with lower liquidity. In our result we see 
that the debt level (DEBT_LEV) is significant and have a positive relation to the bid-ask spread, 
supporting the result that higher debt levels leads to less liquid shares. This is mainly explained 
by the information asymmetry that arises when creditors gets more information than the public.  
 
We have also included dividend policies in our model, which is measured by a dividend dummy 
to capture the difference between firms that pays dividends and the ones that do not. Second, 
we also want to capture if the size of the dividends matter for the firms that do pay dividends 
by measuring the dividend yield (DIV_Y). We realize that the dividend policies captures two 
different effects. First one being that investors might be drawn to companies paying dividends, 
which would then have a positive effect on liquidity due to a higher trading frequency. The 
other effect is that suggested by Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) which explores the 
liquidity hypothesis of dividends. The hypothesis of dividends states that in a market with 
trading frictions, other things equal, firms with less liquid stock are more likely to pay out 
dividends. This means that in that case there would be a positive relation between dividends 
and illiquidity. In our results we see that the dividend dummy is highly significant and show a 
positive relationship with the bid-ask spread, indicating that the second effect dominates the 
first one. In other words, companies paying dividends have a wider bid-ask spread than those 
who do not, indicating less liquid stocks.  
 
However, turning to the actual size of the dividends (DIV_Y) of the companies that do pay 
dividends it seems to have a positive effect on liquidity. This is represented by the fact that the 
dividend yield is significant and has a negative relation to the bid-ask spread in our results. 
These findings can be summarized as the following: firms that do pay dividends tend to have 
less liquid stocks, but the liquidity can be increased by a higher dividend yield.  Finally looking 
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at the adjusted R-squared value it has a value of 59% indicating that the overall fit of our model 
is better using the fixed effects than a pooled regression. 
 
Table 5. Final Regression, Bid-Ask spread 
 
 
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level and 
*indicates significance at 5% level.   
 
Table 6 shows the results for the six models used to check for robustness of the coefficients of 
the firm-adjustable variables by adding each of the control variables one by one. We observe 
consistent coefficients through all the models for all the variables except for the ones that became 
insignificant on the last model (CASH_EQ, F_FLOAT, INST_SHARES, ROE, DIVDUMMY). 
 
 
 
 
Variable BA_S Probability 
Sample Period: 2002M05 2014M12  
Total Panel Observations: 27886  
   
   
C 20.29975*** 0.0000    
CASH_EQ -0.002243 0.4682 
DEBT_LEV 0.010484** 0.0021 
DIV_Y -0.014414** 0.0031 
F_FLOAT -0.002962 0.3301 
INST_SHARES -0.002099 0.4272 
M_CAP -1.305318*** 0.0000 
QUICK_R 0.002356 0.0648 
R_VOL 0.028810*** 0.0000 
ROE 1.01E-06 0.9932 
ROIC -0.011539*** 0.0000 
DIVDUMMY 0.356727*** 0.0000 
   
R-Squared 0.599386  
Adjusted R-squared 0.592859  
F-Statistic 91.83860*** * 
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Table 6. Robustness Check on the Bid-Ask spread 
Dependent Variable: BA_S 
   
  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
       
       C 3.716799*** 3.994457*** 25.57823*** 24.92745*** 22.93968*** 20.29975*** 
CASH_EQ -0.007460** -0.007274** 0.000560 0.000709 8.41E-05 -0.002243 
DEBT_LEV 0.008414*** 0.008086*** 0.002671 0.004165 0.007061* 0.010484** 
DIV_Y -0.014848** -0.000511 -0.011527* -0.011123* -0.011576* -0.014414** 
F_FLOAT -0.005001* -0.005424* 0.002790 -0.001212 -0.002228 -0.002962 
INST_SHARES -0.001093 -0.001195 0.002248 -0.001172 -0.001195 -0.002099 
QUICK_R 0.002593* 0.002541* 0.000823 0.001437 0.002439 0.002356*** 
DIVDUMMY   -0.510748*** 0.202369** 0.243430** 0.205553** 0.356727 
M_CAP    -1.634329*** -1.571521*** -1.425052*** -1.305318*** 
ROE    -0.001866*** 3.51E-05 1.01E-06 
ROIC     -0.010757*** -0.011539*** 
R_VOL      0.028810*** 
       
       Total panel (unbalanced) 
observations: 33637 33637 33481 32366 
 
32061 
 
27886 
       
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level and *indicates significance at 5% level.   
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Amihud Measure: 
 
The results for the final regression on the Amihud measure of liquidity (ILLIQ) are presented in 
Table 7. In order to analyze these results we will first briefly review what the Amihud measure 
actually measures and what are the expected relationships between the dependent variable and 
each of the independent variables. The Amihud is a measure for illiquidity measured by a ratio of 
return over the value of the volume traded. An increase in ILLIQ implies a decrease in the 
liquidity of the stock whereas a decrease implies an increase in the level of liquidity. Based on 
previous research discussed in Chapter II theoretical background it is expected to observe the 
following relationships: a positive relationship between dividend payout (DIV_Y and 
DIVDUMMY) and ILLIQ (e.g. Griffin 2010); a negative relationship between firm liquidity 
(liquidity of the assets measured by CASH_EQ and QUICK_R) and ILLIQ (Gopalan, Kadan and 
Pevzner, 2012); a positive relationship between capital structure (DEBT_LEV) and ILLIQ; and 
a negative relationship between the number of free floating shares (F_FLOAT) and ILLIQ. There 
is however no expected relationship between institutional shares and ILLIQ given that previous 
studies (Agarwal, 2009) have shown how institutional shares can have opposite effects on 
liquidity.  With regards to the control variables it is expected that size (M_CAP) and profitability 
(ROE and ROIC) have a negative relationship. Return volatility is expected to have a positive 
relationship with ILLIQ.  
 
The total number of observations in the regression was of 27714. Given the unbalanced nature of 
the data and the relevant tests conducted to account for heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity a 
fixed effects panel regression with White’s robust error was conducted. Both cross sectional fixed 
effects and period fixed effects were used to allow for variety across companies and across time. 
The fit of this model is nonetheless considerably low (R2=10.6%) and it indicates that the 
variables do not explain a large majority of the Amihud variable. A potential concern raised is 
whether the Amihud measure does indeed measure the liquidity of a stock.   
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Some interesting observations can be made from the results. First we observe that the dividend 
yield variable (DIV_Y) is negative and highly significant. This result is inconsistent with previous 
studies and indicates that the dividend payout is positively related to liquidity, in other words high 
dividend payouts are related to (low ILLIQ) more liquid stock.  
 
CASH_EQ is negative and significant. On the other hand QUICK_R is significant but positive. 
Despite both being significant, these results are contradicting each other. The quick ratio and the 
cash and cash equivalents of a firm measure the firm’s assets’ liquidity which according to 
Gopalan, Kadan and Pevzner (2012) should be positively related to the stock liquidity thus 
negatively related to the Amihud measure. In our results only the coefficient for CASH_EQ is 
consistent with their study. The coefficient for QUICK_R is however of a small magnitude (<1%) 
indicating a very small effect on the Amihud measure.   
 
The debt level of the firm is positively related to the liquidity of the firm’s stock (positively to the 
ILLIQ measure) but our results are insignificant. Finally the results of the variables related to 
firm’s ownership structure indicate at a significant level that a high percentage of free floating 
shares is negatively related to ILLIQ thus positively related to the liquidity of a stock. This is 
consistent with the expected coefficient. It also reveals that the institutional shares are negatively 
related to ILLIQ and positively related to liquidity. This indicates that a higher percentage of 
institutional shares would be a characteristic of a firm with liquid stock.  
 
DEBT_LEV, M_CAP, ROIC and DIVDUMMY are insignificant (Note that M_CAP would be 
significant at a 10% level but the positive sign would suggest an inconsistency with the literature 
[Amihud, 2002]).  When analyzing our control variables we observe that the return volatility is 
negative and highly significant and the remaining profitability measure ROE is positive and 
significant. These findings do not support the literature (e.g. Correia and Amarral, 2014) and 
suggest that a higher volatility is related to a higher level of liquidity while a high growth (ROE) 
is related to a lower level in a stock’s liquidity. 
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Table 7. Final Regression, Amihud Measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level and 
*indicates significance at 5% level.   
 
 
Table 8 shows the results for the six models used to check for robustness of the coefficients of 
the firm-adjustable variables by adding each of the control variables one by one. We observe 
consistent coefficients through all the models for all the variables except for the ones that became 
insignificant on the last model (DEBT_LEV, DIV_DUMMY, M_CAP and ROIC). 
 
 
Variable ILLIQ Probability 
Sample Period: 2002M05 2014M12  
Total Panel Observations: 27714  
   
   C 50.55432*** 0.0000 
CASH_EQ -0.085622* 0.0223 
DEBT_LEV 0.030065 0.5564 
DIV_Y -0.151207*** 0.0004 
F_FLOAT -0.558739*** 0.0000 
INST_SHARES -0.178866*** 0.0006 
M_CAP 1.583185 0.0590 
QUICK_R 0.008764** 0.0047 
R_VOL -0.705600*** 0.0001 
ROE 0.020105*** 0.0008 
ROIC -0.002320 0.9445 
DIVDUMMY -0.101844 0.9420 
R-Squared 0.108650  
Adjusted R-squared 0.094004  
F-Statistic 7.418411*** * 
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Table 8. Robustness Check on the Amihud Measure  
Dependent Variable: ILLIQ 
   
  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
       
       C 70.80738*** 67.26910*** -32.46094 -4.894997 -13.10178 50.55432*** 
CASH_EQ -0.222956** -0.225166** -0.271165** -0.308419** -0.309533** -0.085622* 
DEBT_LEV -0.521280* -0.517147* -0.500937* -0.580878* -0.570974* 0.030065 
DIV_Y 0.030289 -0.134475* -0.083050 -0.118331* -0.121852* -0.151207*** 
F_FLOAT -0.619624*** -0.613963*** -0.652897*** -0.786190*** -0.794158*** -0.558739*** 
INST_SHARES -0.056283 -0.054594 -0.071832 -0.122274* -0.116711* -0.178866*** 
QUICK_R 0.014165** 0.014815** 0.022322*** 0.019089*** 0.023794*** 0.008764** 
DIVDUMMY   6.322207*** 3.049818* 2.888691 2.835028 -0.101844 
M_CAP    7.566842** 6.515444** 7.135340** 1.583185 
ROE    0.028268** 0.037035** 0.020105*** 
ROIC     -0.052373* -0.002320 
R_VOL      -0.705600*** 
       
       Total panel (unbalanced) 
observations: 33380 33380 33235 32146 
 
31838 
 
27714 
       
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level and *indicates significance at 5% level.   
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Turnover: 
 
Table 9 presents the coefficients of the panel regression conducted on the turnover (TURN_VAL) 
as our third measure of liquidity. In this case the turnover is assumed to be positively related with 
liquidity, thus as the turnover of a firm increases so does the liquidity of its stock. The variables 
that are expected to have a positive relationship with TURN_VAL are CASH_EQ, QUICK_R, 
F_FLOAT as well the control variables ROE, ROIC and M_CAP. On the other hand the variables 
with a negative expected relationship are DEBT_LEV, DIV_Y, DIVDUMMY, and R_VOL. 
Institutional share holding has been shown to be positive and negative due to its non-monotonic 
relationship with liquidity (Agarwal, 2009). The total number of observations in the regression 
was of 27675. Given the unbalanced nature of the data and the relevant tests conducted to account 
for heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity a random effects panel regression with White’s robust 
errors was realized on the final model. It is important to note that we obtain an extremely low fit 
for the model (R2 <1%). A possible explanation for this is the fact that this measure captures many 
factors at the same time, making it a very noisy measure as previously stated. 
 
In this model we observe a negative and highly significant coefficient for the dividend yield 
(DIV_Y: -0.4481). This indicates that an increase in dividend yield results in a decrease in the 
liquidity of the stock. This finding is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis of dividends 
(Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt, 2007). The coefficients of the variables measuring the firm’s 
assets’ liquidity (CASH_EQ, QUICK_R) show once more an opposite relationship to liquidity. 
The coefficient for CASH_EQ is highly significant and positive whereas the coefficient for 
QUICK_R is significant but negative. The findings on QUICK_R are inconsistent with the 
expected relationship to liquidity and indicate that firms with higher quick ratio have lower 
liquidity.  
The debt level of the firm (DEBT_LEV) is positively related to liquidity suggesting that an 
increase in the debt leverage would improve liquidity. However these results are insignificant. 
Lastly we analyze our fourth aspect of a firm: its ownership structure. In this model only the free-
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floating shares’ F_FLOAT coefficient is significant and positive. It indicates, consistently with 
expectations that increasing the percentage of free-floating shares would result in an increase in 
liquidity. Out of the control variables only M_CAP and ROIC are significant and both are 
positively related to liquidity as previous studies suggest (Amihud, 2002).  
 
Table 9. Final Regression, Turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level and 
*indicates significance at 5% level.   
 
In table 10 we present the results of the different models to check for robustness of the coefficients 
by running regressions of the firm-adjustable variables and then subsequently adding each of the 
non-firm-adjustable control variables. We observe a consistency of the coefficients throughout 
all the models for all the variables even the ones that are not significant.  
 
 
Variable TURN_VAL Probability 
Sample Period: 2002M05 2014M12  
Total Panel Observations: 27675  
   
   
C -412.3470** 0.0072 
CASH_EQ 1.603080** 0.0018 
DEBT_LEV 0.112253 0.6569 
DIV_Y -0.448176** 0.0057 
F_FLOAT 1.131424** 0.0022 
INST_SHARES 0.021124 0.7734 
M_CAP 21.82988** 0.0050 
QUICK_R -0.075088* 0.0134 
R_VOL 0.588355 0.2609 
ROE -0.002056 0.7489 
ROIC 0.208110** 0.0016 
DIVDUMMY 6.634536 0.3346 
   
R-Squared 0.004078  
Adjusted R-squared 0.003682  
F-Statistic 10.29709*** * 
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Table 10. Robustness Check on Turnover  
Dependent Variable: TURN_VAL     
       
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  
       
       C -67.71544** -81.18677** -334.4201** -341.6786** -336.2579** -412.3470** 
CASH_EQ 1.302514** 1.333979** 1.314928** 1.335330** 1.338924** 1.603080** 
DEBT_LEV 0.041396 0.052949 0.056736 0.080468 0.073753 0.112253 
DIV_Y -0.103300 -0.770039*** -0.391888* -0.369169* -0.362860* -0.448176** 
F_FLOAT 0.862408** 0.893987** 0.890783** 0.915589** 0.921435** 1.131424** 
INST_SHARES 0.306138** 0.281895** 0.060449 0.065313 0.055179 0.021124 
QUICK_R -0.065908* -0.066288* -0.055121* -0.057450* -0.062475* -0.075088* 
DIVDUMMY   23.14759*** 5.690429 5.416515 5.350962 6.634536 
M_CAP    19.41343** 19.73600** 19.33723** 21.82988** 
ROE    0.010163 -0.000877 -0.002056 
ROIC     0.063040* 0.208110** 
R_VOL      0.588355 
       
       Total panel (unbalanced) 
observations: 33330 33330 33185 32098 
 
31790 
 
27675 
       
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level and *indicates significance at 5% level.   
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Comparative analysis: 
 
Table 11 presents the regression results for our variables across all three measurements of 
liquidity. By doing, this we can see which variables that are significant across either two or all 
three of our liquidity measurements and the degree of significance associated with each variable. 
A conclusion could be reached about the relationship of our independent variables if the 
coefficients are consistent and significant across at least two of our liquidity measurements. 
 
 Our results show that just one variable is significant across all three measurements on a 
significance level of 5% or less.  The variable that is significant across all three measurements is 
DIV_Y, suggesting it has an overall relationship with liquidity. The relationship seems to be 
negative for all three measurements, suggesting that it lowers the bid-ask spread, the Amihud 
measure and the turnover. This seems inconclusive since this means that a higher dividend yield 
means a more liquid stock when measuring liquidity with the bid-ask spread and the Amihud 
measure. However, when looking at turnover as a proxy for liquidity the relationship seems to be 
the opposite, a higher dividend yield means less trade and thereby a more illiquid stock. This 
result might partly be explained by the findings of Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) that 
showed that less liquid companies tend to pay dividends in the first place.  A definitive 
relationship between the dividend yield and liquidity cannot be established from our data. 
 
Turning to the variables that show significance over two of our liquidity measurements, we find 
CASH_EQ, F_FLOAT, M_CAP, QUICK_R, R_VOL and ROIC. This result seems to verify the 
findings of previous studies that found these variables significant in explaining liquidity. 
Gopalan, Kadan and Pevzner (2012) found a positive relationship between a firm’s assets 
liquidity and its stock liquidity, this result partially consistent with our findings. CASH_EQ has 
a negative relationship with the Amihud measure and a positive relationship with turnover, 
indicating a positive overall relationship with liquidity. QUICK_R on the other hand seem to 
have a negative overall relationship with liquidity since it has a positive relationship with the 
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Amihud measure, and a negative relationship with turnover. These opposite results from the two 
variables measuring the same firm’s assets’ liquidity can be attributed to the fact that they capture 
different aspects of the firm’s liquidity.  
 
Our variable for debt level is only significant for the bid-ask spread and we cannot make any 
conclusions about its relationship with liquidity from these findings. 
 
Amihud and Mendelson (2000) suggested that increasing the free-floating shares would decrease 
the bid-ask spread and as a result increase the stock liquidity. Free-floating shares are not 
significant for explaining the bid-ask spread in our data, but it is significant for explaining the 
Amihud measure and the turnover. As we can see, free-floating shares have a negative 
relationship with the Amihud measure and a positive relationship with turnover, again indicating 
a positive overall relationship with liquidity. However our variable for institutional shares is only 
significant for the Amihud measurement and thus we cannot make any conclusions about its 
relationship with liquidity from these findings. 
 
Amihud (2002) shows a positive relationship between firm size and liquidity, which are consistent 
with our findings. M_CAP have a positive relationship with turnover and a negative relationship 
with bid-ask spread, indicating a positive overall relationship with liquidity. Turning to one of 
our measurements for profitability, ROIC, we find that it has a negative relationship with the bid-
ask spread and a positive relationship with turnover, indicating a positive overall relationship with 
liquidity.  
 
As a final note the adjusted R-squared values associated with the different measurements is 
somewhat different. With a rather good fit for the bid-ask spread at 59% and quite a low fit for 
both Amihud measure, 10% and turnover at just 0,4 %. Suggesting that our data explains the bid-
ask spread the best.  
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Table 11. Final Regressions, Comparison table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable BA_S ILLIQ TURN_VAL 
Sample Period: 2002M05 2014M12 2002M05 2014M12 2002M05 2014M12 
Total Panel Observations: 27886 27714 27675 
    
    C 20.29975*** 50.55432*** -412.3470** 
CASH_EQ -0.002243 -0.085622* 1.603080** 
DEBT_LEV 0.010484** 0.030065 0.112253 
DIV_Y -0.014414** -0.151207*** -0.448176** 
F_FLOAT -0.002962 -0.558739*** 1.131424** 
INST_SHARES -0.002099 -0.178866*** 0.021124 
M_CAP -1.305318*** 1.583185 21.82988** 
QUICK_R 0.002356 0.008764** -0.075088* 
R_VOL 0.028810*** -0.705600*** 0.588355 
ROE 1.01E-06 0.020105*** -0.002056 
ROIC -0.011539*** -0.002320 0.208110** 
DIVDUMMY 0.356727*** -0.101844 6.634536 
    
R-Squared 0.599386 0.108650 0.004078 
Adjusted R-squared 0.592859 0.094004 0.003682 
F-Statistic 91.83860*** 7.418411*** 10.29709*** 
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1% level, ** indicates significance at 1% level and *indicates 
significance at 5% level.   
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V. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
With the technology advancements of the new century, investors are able to monitor a firm’s 
stock price continuously as well as execute trade orders instantaneously. This has many 
implications for the managers which need to carefully tailor financial and non-financial policies 
that may or may not affect stock prices. Amihud (1986) showed the relationship between the 
stock returns and liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread. The study showed that a liquidity 
premium was included in the expected stock returns. Later studies have also verified this 
relationship between stock returns and liquidity by looking at liquidity associated costs. Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) derived a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM) to 
capture the impact of liquidity risk and commonality on asset pricing. This model shows that 
the stock price can be modified by improving the liquidity, everything else held constant. Given 
this relationship many studies have explored different factors that have a relationship with stock 
liquidity.  
 
Bharath, Pasquariello and Wu (2009) explored the relationship between a firm’s capital 
structure and its associated stock liquidity. Their paper demonstrates that firms that have a 
higher debt level will have assets with lower liquidity due to information asymmetric. Turning 
to dividend policies Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) as well as  Brockman, Howe and 
Mortal (2008)  found support that dividend payouts are a form of compensation for less liquid 
stocks, indicating that firms with less liquid stocks are more likely to payout dividends.  
 
Regarding ownership structure, Sarin, Shastri and Shastri (1999) showed that liquidity 
decreases as the level of inside ownership increases. Amihud and Mendelson (2000) also argued 
that increasing the shareholder base as measured by free-floating shares, would increase liquidity.  
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Gopalan, Kadan and Pevzner (2012) found a positive relationship between stock liquidity and 
the liquidity of the assets of a company, where cash is the most liquid asset. Besides these 
factors, other firm characteristics such as firm size and firm profitability have also been proven 
to have a relationship with liquidity.  
 
Based on these previous studies we included the same set of independent and control variables to 
see if these where significant in explaining liquidity for firms on the Swedish stock market. The 
findings allow for some interesting conclusions for the different factors researched.  
 
Regarding firm liquidity as measured by cash and cash equivalents, as well as the quick ratio we 
find that these are consistent but shows opposite relationships with liquidity. Cash and cash 
equivalents have a positive relationship with liquidity and the quick ratio has a negative 
relationship. Looking at dividend policies we find that the results are inconsistent preventing us 
from making a conclusion regarding the relationship between dividend policies and liquidity. 
 
Looking at the capital structure as measured by the debt level we find that it is inconsistent and 
that we cannot draw any conclusion regarding its relationship with liquidity.  Turning to the 
ownership structure, measured by the number of free-floating shares as well as the institutional 
held shares we find free-floating shares to be consistent. Free-floating shares show a positive 
relationship with liquidity.  
 
We also included control variables in our study which are not firm adjustable in the same sense 
that our independent variables. These were included to capture firm size and firm profitability.  
Market cap was used to measure firm size, and we find that it is consistent and have a positive 
relationship with liquidity. To measure profitability we used both return on equity and return 
on invested capital.  The results were inconsistent for return on equity meaning we could not 
make any conclusion about its relationship with liquidity. However return on invested capital 
was consistent and showed a positive relationship with liquidity.  
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These findings suggest that there are some factors that companies can improve to affect its stock 
liquidity and as a result increase its share price, everything else being equal.  Our study found 
that out of our independent variables both cash and cash equivalents and the number of free-
floating shares had a consistent and significant positive relationship with liquidity.  This means 
that an increase in these variables would increase stock liquidity and thereby affect the stock 
price in a positive way.  Furthermore we verified previous studies showing that the control 
variables, firm size and firm profitability, have a positive relationship with liquidity. 
 
However with each implementation there are associated costs which might outweigh the benefits. 
The associated costs need to be further investigated by future studies to conclude whether or not 
firms should implement the suggested findings. At the same time they should look at which 
variables are the most cost-effective to increase when improving liquidity. Another suggestion 
based on our study is that future research could look if the Amihud measure and the turnover are 
appropriate measurements for liquidity on the Swedish stock market using the variables suggested 
in previous studies. As a final idea, future research should explore the magnitude of the effects of 
each of these policies by conducting a study with a narrow approach on a single explanatory 
variable.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1 Graph: Bid Ask Spread evolution through time 
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A.2 Graph: Amihud measure evolution through time 
 
A.3 Graph: Turnover evolution through time 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B.1 Heteroscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan test: Bid-Ask Spread 
Dependent Variable: RESIDUALBAS^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2002M05 2014M12  
Periods included: 151   
Cross-sections included: 287   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 27886  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 53.61488 7.128720 7.520968 0.0000 
CASH_EQ 0.120186 0.033639 3.572774 0.0004 
DEBT_LEV 0.112793 0.037180 3.033705 0.0024 
DIV_Y -0.198609 0.190167 -1.044390 0.2963 
F_FLOAT -0.240130 0.033103 -7.254003 0.0000 
INST_SHARES -0.193746 0.055130 -3.514330 0.0004 
M_CAP -5.240215 0.379750 -13.79911 0.0000 
QUICK_R 0.046366 0.028133 1.648115 0.0993 
R_VOL 1.152206 0.086674 13.29349 0.0000 
ROE 0.009597 0.006628 1.447935 0.1476 
ROIC -0.077164 0.019356 -3.986520 0.0001 
DIVDUMMY 10.41384 2.219833 4.691274 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.031738    Mean dependent var 15.50865 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031355    S.D. dependent var 122.0256 
S.E. of regression 120.0973    Akaike info criterion 12.41491 
Sum squared resid 4.02E+08    Schwarz criterion 12.41846 
Log likelihood -173089.1    Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.41605 
F-statistic 83.05895    Durbin-Watson stat 1.023768 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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B.2 Heteroscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan test:  Amihud Measure 
Dependent Variable: ILLIQRESIDUAL^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2002M05 2014M12  
Periods included: 152   
Cross-sections included: 287   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 27714  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 47950.25 30782.33 1.557720 0.1193 
CASH_EQ -305.5185 145.9655 -2.093087 0.0364 
DEBT_LEV 512.4951 161.0774 3.181670 0.0015 
DIV_Y -109.0242 780.3830 -0.139706 0.8889 
F_FLOAT -973.1509 142.7427 -6.817518 0.0000 
INST_SHARES -712.6467 237.8464 -2.996248 0.0027 
M_CAP 13.89711 121.2257 0.114638 0.9087 
QUICK_R -1974.740 1641.924 -1.202699 0.2291 
R_VOL 1586.786 376.4644 4.214971 0.0000 
ROE 18.63057 28.57966 0.651882 0.5145 
ROIC -129.6303 85.89149 -1.509234 0.1313 
DIVDUMMY 3268.985 9573.871 0.341449 0.7328 
     
     R-squared 0.003137    Mean dependent var 10137.29 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002741    S.D. dependent var 518135.4 
S.E. of regression 517424.7    Akaike info criterion 29.15155 
Sum squared resid 7.42E+15    Schwarz criterion 29.15511 
Log likelihood -403941.0    Hannan-Quinn criter. 29.15270 
F-statistic 7.925800    Durbin-Watson stat 0.739904 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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B.3 Heteroscedasticity, Breusch-Pagan test:  Turnover 
 
Dependent Variable: TURNRESIDUAL^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample (adjusted): 2002M05 2014M12  
Periods included: 152   
Cross-sections included: 286   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 27675  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -5607470. 1020960. -5.492353 0.0000 
CASH_EQ 14505.59 4845.711 2.993491 0.0028 
DEBT_LEV 17692.66 5346.786 3.309027 0.0009 
DIV_Y 6175.425 25867.39 0.238734 0.8113 
F_FLOAT 8805.915 4732.027 1.860918 0.0628 
INST_SHARES -6593.247 7888.533 -0.835801 0.4033 
M_CAP 215944.9 54469.75 3.964493 0.0001 
QUICK_R -2529.496 4018.097 -0.629526 0.5290 
R_VOL 44384.59 12494.74 3.552261 0.0004 
ROE 514.0072 947.5117 0.542481 0.5875 
ROIC 5730.886 2868.687 1.997739 0.0458 
DIVDUMMY -231159.7 317728.5 -0.727539 0.4669 
     
     R-squared 0.002129    Mean dependent var 275582.8 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001732    S.D. dependent var 17164524 
S.E. of regression 17149654    Akaike info criterion 36.15329 
Sum squared resid 8.14E+18    Schwarz criterion 36.15686 
Log likelihood -500259.1    Hannan-Quinn criter. 36.15444 
F-statistic 5.364776    Durbin-Watson stat 0.396811 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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APPENDIX C 
C.1 Redundant fixed effects test:  Bid-Ask Spread 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: BASREG   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 89.491279 (286,27438) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 18376.208280 286 0.0000 
Period F 9.286526 (150,27438) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 1380.957972 150 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period F 62.448997 (436,27438) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 19222.062037 436 0.0000 
 
C.2 Redundant fixed effects test:  Amihud Measure 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: ILLIQREG   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 9.857326 (286,27265) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 2726.950237 286 0.0000 
Period F 1.473520 (151,27265) 0.0001 
Period Chi-square 225.247892 151 0.0001 
Cross-Section/Period F 6.894233 (437,27265) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 2904.711798 437 0.0000 
 
C.3 Redundant fixed effects test:  Turnover 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: TURNREG   
Test cross-section and period fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 11.813077 (285,27227) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 3226.513646 285 0.0000 
Period F 1.355032 (151,27227) 0.0025 
Period Chi-square 207.198973 151 0.0016 
Cross-Section/Period F 8.234279 (436,27227) 0.0000 
Cross-Section/Period Chi-square 3427.883163 436 0.0000 
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C.4 Coefficient comparison tables 
BA_S  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 27886 
     
    
Variable\ Method 
Panel Least 
Squares 
(PLS) 
PLS- 
CS and P 
Fixed Effects 
PLS-  
Random Effects 
    
C 15.50730*** 20.29975*** 24.12123*** 
CASH_EQ 0.003567** -0.002243 -0.003028 
DEBT_LEV 0.003043 0.010484** 0.011190*** 
DIV_Y -0.030900** -0.014414** 0.007386 
F_FLOAT -0.027356*** -0.002962 -0.011600*** 
INST_SHARES -0.007693** -0.002099 -0.017458*** 
M_CAP -0.968291*** -1.305318*** -1.540373*** 
QUICK_R 0.004894** 0.002356 0.002657** 
R_VOL 0.057783*** 0.028810*** 0.033860*** 
ROE 0.000600* 1.01E-06 0.000209 
ROIC -0.009276*** -0.011539*** -0.013484*** 
DIVDUMMY 0.458529*** 0.356727*** 0.292795** 
    
R-squared 0.214112 0.599386 0.579047 
Adjusted R-squared 0.213463 0.592859 0.574516 
F-statistic 330.0391 91.83860 127.7747 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
 
ILLIQ  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 27714 
     
    
Variable\ Method 
Panel Least 
Squares 
(PLS) 
PLS- 
CS and P 
Fixed Effects 
PLS-  
Random Effects 
    
C 31.02011*** 50.55432*** 88.29091*** 
CASH_EQ -0.080274** -0.085622* -0.042662 
DEBT_LEV 0.136843*** 0.030065 0.042137 
DIV_Y -0.080617 -0.151207** -0.022184 
F_FLOAT -0.363695*** -0.558739*** -0.500500*** 
INST_SHARES -0.208969*** -0.178866** -0.294966** 
M_CAP -1.148229** 1.583185 -2.518481*** 
QUICK_R 0.003888 0.008764** 0.003718 
R_VOL 0.419464*** -0.705600*** -0.260725** 
ROE -0.001880 0.020105** 0.019799** 
ROIC -0.030887 -0.002320 -0.027041** 
DIVDUMMY 1.591619 -0.101844 -0.923350 
    
R-squared 0.012493 0.108650 0.005336 
Adjusted R-squared 0.011673 0.094004 0.004941 
F-statistic 15.23093 7.418411 13.51021 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
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TURN_VAL  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 27714 
     
    
Variable\ Method 
Panel Least 
Squares 
(PLS) 
PLS- 
CS and P 
Fixed Effects 
PLS-  
Random Effects 
    
C -257.2529*** -294.3808*** -412.3470** 
CASH_EQ 0.470345** 0.485004** 1.603080** 
DEBT_LEV 0.481655** 0.429538** 0.112253 
DIV_Y -0.054796 -0.507828 -0.448176** 
F_FLOAT 0.703592*** 0.711469*** 1.131424** 
INST_SHARES -0.031326 -0.014693 0.021124 
M_CAP 12.24055*** 13.27250*** 21.82988** 
QUICK_R -0.059294 -0.075963 -0.075088* 
R_VOL 1.820604*** 1.777050*** 0.588355 
ROE 0.016262 0.014048 -0.002056 
ROIC 0.243854** 0.261485** 0.208110** 
DIVDUMMY 10.77278 10.79342 6.634536 
    
R-squared 0.007989 0.005087 0.004078 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007164 0.004691 0.003682 
F-statistic 9.681975 12.85756 10.29709 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
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APPENDIX D 
 
D.1 Jarque-Bera Test of Normality : Bid-Ask Spread Regression 
 
 
 
D.2 Jarque-Bera Test of Normality : Amihud Measure Regression 
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D.3 Jarque-Bera Test of Normality : Turnover Regression 
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